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Abstract 
This text is a presentation of the notion of ontological imagination. It consti-
tutes an attempt to merge two traditions: critical sociology and science and 
technology studies - STS (together with the Actor-Network Theory – ANT). By 
contrasting  these  two  intellectual  traditions,  I  attempt  to  bring  together: 
a humanist ethical-political sensitivity and a posthumanist ontological insight. 
My starting point is the premise that contemporary world needs new social 
ontology and new critical theory based on it in order to overcome the uncon-
sciously adapted, “slice-based” modernist vision of social ontology. I am con-
vinced that we need new ontological frameworks of the social combined with 
a research disposition which I refer to as ontological imagination. 
Keywords:  ontological  imagination;  ontological  turn;  methodological  solip-
sism; interdysciplinarity; phronesis. 
Introduction 
The notion of ontological imagination that I propose in the present text consti-
tutes an attempt to combine two traditions: critical sociology and science and 
technology studies - STS (together with the Actor-Network Theory - ANT). To 
use shorthand, this project could be referred to as fusing Mills
29 together with 
Latour. But what does that mean? The first author is a symbol of critical soci-
ology (Mucha 1986), the latter - a person who, next to Donna Haraway, has 
become the trademark of posthumanist thought.
30 Contrasting these two con-
                                                             
29 Obviously I am referring to Mills’ Sociological Imagination, first published in 1959, Polish trans-
lation 2007. 
30  Qualifying  B.  Latour  as  a  post-humanist  author  might  be  somewhat  misleading.  The  actor-
network theory in its late form is “realist realism”, and Latour strongly dissociates himself from 
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stitutes an attempt to bring together fire and water: humanist ethical-political 
sensitivity and posthumanist ontological insight. Why do we need such a syn-
thesis? My starting assumption is that one of the problems plaguing the con-
temporary humanities and social sciences is their isolation from social prob-
lems (Flyvbjerg 2001: 166). This is why we need a renewal of the potential of 
critical  thought (sociology and  public philosophy).  One  of  the  reasons  why 
social sciences cannot adequately participate in debates regarding the con-
cerns and problems of our communities is the social ontology they share. It is 
the unconsciously adapted, modernist, “slice-based” vision of social ontology 
(in the broader sense of the term), within which social subsystem can be sepa-
rated, as can, among others, culture, politics, economics, science and religion 
subsystems
31. Today we know that these fictively-traced boundaries of mo-
dernity cannot be upheld (cf. Beck 1992, Feenberg 2010: 181). The ozone hole, 
anti-vaccination movements, energy security, terrorism and religious revival 
do not fit simple modernist frames (cf. Latour 2011). One can easily notice that 
all these phenomena are connected and how much we miss by analysing them 
separately. I am convinced that we need new ontological frameworks of that 
what is social and a research disposition which I refer to as ontological imagi-
nation. 
What is the origin of this notion? One should start from a diagnosis: I am con-
vinced that critical thought is in the state of a profound crisis, partly because 
in the course of its evolution it parted with ontological thinking. This is related 
to the excessive attachment to epistemological analyses, partly arising from 
Kantian and neo-Kantian heritage, as well as from postmodern critique. An 
additional problem is posed by the “toothlessness” of critical sociology in dis-
putes regarding social-scientific problems and controversies. Habermas may 
serve as a hallmark example, as an author of an extensive theory of moderni-
ty and modernisation who did not analyse issues of technology at any point 
(Feenberg  2010:  129-156).  This  is  also  connected  to  neo-Luddite  tendencies 
that have accrued since the countercultural revolution of 1968 (Nowak 2013b). 
A partial deliverance can be found in science and technology studies and the 
actor-network theory, which have brought about inspiring solutions regarding 
ontology. They have also made it possible to transcend the theory-centrism in 
approaches to science and technology, thanks to “lowering the tone” (Shapin 
2010:1-14) of stories about science and technology, which was in turn due to 
the ethnographic research into technoscience and its real, practical function-
ing. There is hope that such research will gradually decrease the alienation 
felt by social scientists that results from the rapid development of technosci-
                                                                                                                                                             
postmodernism.  Locating  him  within  posthumanism  might  be  unfortunate,  as  many  authors 
within this trend are quite strongly dependent on the postmodern legacy. 
31 Cognitive scientists and system thinkers usually add one more “slice”: the personality subsys-
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ence. There is also hope that it will translate into the increase in reflexivity 
among larger numbers of the participants of the public sphere and decrease 
alienation and future shock in contemporary societies. However, in order for 
that to be possible, a certain revision of this research is needed as well. This is 
because somewhere in the course of their existence, STS and ANT have lost 
the possibility of constructing a full-bodied critical instance as part of their 
framework,  which  necessitates  their  supplementation.  This  especially  per-
tains to the actor-network theory, which can be accused of conformism and a 
tendency to “favour the winners” (Feenberg 2010: 144). Feenberg suggests that 
the critical potential related to considering the legacy of critical theory (Mar-
cuse)  and  traditional  philosophical  approaches  (Heidegger)  should  be  re-
newed. He creates an interesting synthesis of critical theory, philosophy of 
technology and science and technology studies. However, I believe that it is 
worth following a different, alternative path, one that does not coincide with 
the  philosophical  canon.  I  am  convinced  that  the  “entrance  fee”  required 
while reading Heidegger and Marcuse is too high. Those socialised within phi-
losophy are able to pay it with benefit; however, I am convinced that for those 
without education in philosophy the cost is too high and it is not offset by the 
achieved results. This is why I suggest a different road. The notion of ontologi-
cal imagination becomes inscribed in the quests undertaken within the criti-
cal  theory  of  technology  (Feenberg  2002);  yet,  in  contrast  to  the  latter,  a 
stronger accent is put on STS and ANT, and not on philosophy and critical the-
ory.  
My proposal takes on the following form: firstly, C. W. Mills and his notion of 
sociological  imagination  constitute  an  interesting  way  of  “politicising” 
knowledge, i.e. sensitising us to duties and axiological entanglements inherent 
in conducting research, and the achievements of STS and ANT - the so-called 
ontological turn (Heur, Leydesedorff & Wyatt 2013: 341-362) - make it possible 
to track the “circulation” of our actions and the consequences they have for 
the community. 
The notion of ontological imagination is conceived as multi-faceted, and if one 
follows Mills and draws and analogy to sociological imagination, at least three 
main aspects thereof can be listed: methodological, sociological-historical, and 
moral-political. Let us characterise each of them. The methodological aspect of 
ontological imagination is, above all, the abandonment of the ideal of science 
as theory and letting go of the illusions related to humanistic fundamentalism 
(Abriszewski 2010: 143-157). Using ontological imagination requires noticing 
the  complex  network  of actors that construct  our  collective,  in  accordance 
with the principle of symmetry, raised by Bruno Latour (Latour 2011). The 
second aspect consists in the response to the challenge posed by the so-called 
reflexive modernity and to the fears evoked by technoscience (Nowak 2012). It 
is the hope that disseminating such sensitivity and cognitive disposition will 
help to empower groups and individuals in the world of technoscience. Evi-Ontological imagination ... 
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dence-based patients’ movements constitute my main inspiration in this re-
spect (Rabeharisoa, Moreira & Akrich 2013).  
Finally, the third aspect are the moral-political obligations; it is not enough to 
recognise the rhizomatic nature of reality, one should suggest how to move 
within its entangled nodes and how to reshape its strands. Ontological imagi-
nation is the awareness of the fact that we have obligations both cognitive and 
axiological. They cannot be separated from each other. 
This task I have set before ontological imagination is somewhat tremendous; 
not only must we reconcile with the collapse of modernist “ontological hy-
giene” (Bakke 2010: 17), but also we should practice transgressing formerly 
drawn lines and divisions. Here, however, a more difficult moment occurs: 
the work of the imagination has two aspects: sociological (holistic), and con-
structive (Wesołowski 1975). Simply subverting former disciplinary divisions 
is only the first part of the task. It is radical, courageous work of the imagina-
tion, which consists in working through the limitations resulting from histori-
cal and  institutional  conditions,  institutional  inertia,  i.e.  what  I  refer  to as 
methodological solipsism. In order to complete the picture it is essential to 
include the second aspect of the work of the imagination - the constructive 
one. It is more difficult, requires taking risks, designating perspectives and 
assuming  responsibility.  The  former  has  a  more  ontological  character,  the 
latter - a stronger political component. The work of the sociological-holistic 
imagination answers Latour’s question “how many are we?” whereas politi-
cal-constructive imagination answers the question of “can we live together?” 
(Latour 2004: 8). The first of these questions parallels traditional academic 
(research) work, it is the painstaking work of reproducing the shape of our 
collectivity, transforming it into words, notions, inscriptions. The second as-
pect of the imagination consists in fufilling the promise and calling forth the 
engaged intellectual. It is a risky undertaking, demanding that Lenin’s gesture 
be repeated - Lenin’s gesture so well described in Stefan Żeromski’s 1925 nov-
el The Spring to Come (original title Przedwiośnie):  
Do you have the boldness of Lenin to begin something never seen before, 
to demolish the old and institute the new? You only know how to abuse, to 
defame, to gossip. Do you have within you the dogged fortitude of those 
people—the steadfast virtus that may be mistaken in its calculations, but 
which is beyond a doubt a great attempt to improve humanity? (Żeromski 
[1925] 2007: 399). 
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On a more practical level, it is also an attempt to reconcile two “Greek”
 32 in-
ventions: democracy and science, an attempt to reconcile the Reason, Might 
and Representation of the Plurality (Latour 1999). Such an attempt is a partial 
repetition of the gesture made by Laclau and Mouffe (Bobako 2010: 79-82), 
who wanted to rescue political-emancipatory content of the Enlightenment, 
and, simultaneously, to transcend its epistemological limitations. In the case 
of ontological imagination, such an attempt is realised as the will to rescue 
modernist,  emancipatory  political  hope  and  the  rejection  of  the  Modernist 
Constitution (Latour 2011). I am convinced that the solution proposed by Bru-
no Latour (Latour 2009) is insufficient. Abandoning modernist illusions is an 
important procedure on the ontological level. Showing the complexity of onto-
logical  conditions  and  sensitising  to  the  multiplicity  of  perspectives  which 
should be applied to the analysis of phenomena, in turn, constitute the “aca-
demic” moment. Contrary to Latour, I believe there is no easy transition from 
ontological  analysis  (“how  many  are  we”)  to  a  political-ethical  articulation 
(“can we live together”). I agree with the aforementioned Andrew Feenberg 
and  with  Steve  Fuller  that  actor-network  theory  may  be  harmful  to  the 
“cause” and “promise” of the social sciences, as it does not provide sufficient 
tools for affecting political engagement (Fuller 2006: 52). As radicalisation of 
ethnology, ANT provides us good, dense descriptions of reality. Such a “flat 
ontology” is sufficient when we want to conduct ontological analyses, “follow-
ing the actors”. However, such analyses are only a part of what constitutes 
activity in the field of social sciences (and its cultural functions). The Millsian 
stipulation of “sociological imagination”, the promise of social sciences is not 
merely research activity - in his opinion it must be supplemented by activity 
of the so-called intellectuals, that is by aware participation in arguments, con-
flicts, concerns and cares of our collective. Latour is aware of this role of so-
cial science, however, he does not seem aware of the ambiguous character of 
ANT here. Staying in the ANT framework poses the danger of being stuck in 
the “karmic world-view” (Fuller 2006: 146). Karmic world-view, which accord-
ing to Fuller is characteristic of the neoliberal capitalist culture, as well as so-
called Darwinian left (Dawkins, Singer) constitutes the return to perceiving 
the world as a place where there is no interplay between free will and deter-
ministic laws.  
Let us embark on a preliminary definition of the notion we are interested in 
here: by ontological imagination I understand a certain ability, skill, research 
predisposition. This means on the one hand the ability to recognise the condi-
tions of one’s own situatedness and on the other - movement, allowing for it to 
be transcended. Ontological imagination, to synthesise this as far as possible, 
is both a radical multiplication of frames of reference which can be used in 
                                                             
32 It obviously should be kept in mind that the portrayal of Ancient Greece was to a large degree 
fabricated in the 19th century (Bernal 1987). Ontological imagination ... 
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a given  study  (Latour  2010:  99),  and  the  ability  to  choose  the  appropriate 
frame at any given place and time. The first disposition requires interdiscipli-
nary training. One needs socialisation in many regimes of intellectual work, 
multiple research teams
33 and only this can give one the ability to use many 
frames of reference, necessary in the process of “opening social sciences” and 
creating one broad space for social research (cf. Wallerstein & Flis 1999). The 
question when and where to use a given frame is more difficult. It sends us 
back to the issue of prudence, practical wisdom - phronesis. The sense of the 
right moment, using the right frame means also the necessity of maintaining 
the game with multiple frames of reference, and it requires the use of violence 
(Zybertowicz 1995: 367). Following the ontological turn (Heur, Leydesedorff & 
Wyatt 2013: 341-362), unlike Zybertowicz, however, I would associate the cat-
egory of violence with ontology (rather than cognition), which is related to the 
evolution of constructivism itself. However, I agree with Zybertowicz that it is 
precisely the establishing of new cultural fields (and the destruction of old 
ones), founding (and demolishing) of social structures that constitutes a cru-
cial task of philosophy and social sciences. In my opinion such a task requires 
from the researcher both ontological analysis and for ontological imagination 
to be ethical action as well. The violence related to the choice of frame of ref-
erence in a given place and time is unambiguously associated with responsi-
bility for said choice. This moment is the return to the modernist promise of 
our studies, which consists not only in studying but also participating in social 
change (or even commencing thereof).
34 For example, the analysis of the anti-
vaccination movement is fascinating; ANT helps us to understand the com-
plexity of this phenomenon. However, we are also participants of our collec-
tive, and sometimes we happen to need to speak as experts, which forces us to 
take a stand. On the one hand, we may sympathise with the movements of 
fearful, alienated patients. Criticising and revealing the abuses of the techno-
cratic science, cooperating with the power of capital and the bio-liberal power 
of the state is a worthy endeavour. On the other hand, however, one cannot 
fail to notice that the critique of the state and the science it is related to (evi-
dence-based medicine) today leads to hastening their decomposition. Will we 
help  to  empower  patients  by  allying  with  the  anti-vaccination  activists, 
                                                             
33It is worth to refer here to an anecdote regarding various regimes of work. The author of the 
present article had the indubitable pleasure of participating in seminars conducted by the late 
Professor  Kozyr-Kowalski,  which  consisted  in  very  piercing  discussions  and  work  on  selected 
classical readings in sociology. For instance, Durkheim’s The Division of Labour in Society  was 
analysed throughout the entire semestre during weekly meetings. On average, a given student 
would  prepare ca.  10 pages  of text for presentation during a  meeting. When it was my turn, 
I prepared 20 pages. The professor reprimanded me; he said that they had to forgive me such 
hastiness, as Mr. Andrzej is a philosophy student. 
34 Paradoxically, in risk society and within the broad spectrum of controversy related to the func-
tioning of technoscience, changing society may consist in slowing down the changes caused by 
innovation. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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or conversely, will we place them at the mercy of disease and the capital. Such 
a decision cannot be merely academic, it requires prudent decisions made in 
“real time”, in the here and now of the social life (Nowak 2012).  
The use of the category of prudence (phronesis) is not accidental. By introduc-
ing the notion of ontological imagination I consciously want to subscribe to 
the  movement  referred  to  by  its  initiator  as  phronetic  social  sciences 
(Flyvbjerg 2001). Terry Eagleton noticed that “[f]or Aristotle [...] ethics and 
politics are intimately related. Ethics is about excelling at being human, and 
nobody can do this in isolation” (Eagleton 2003: 142). He also remarks that 
Marx was a moralist, “the Aristotle of the modern age” (144). It seems that 
Mills and his notion of “sociological imagination” were a direct continuation 
of  this  Aristotelian-Marxist  heritage.  Introducing  the  category  of  prudence 
(phronesis)  not  only  binds  various  positions  but  also  makes  it  possible  to 
transcend the impasse social sciences have found themselves in after the “sci-
ence wars” (Flyvvbjerg 2001: 1-5). It is all the more needed since the develop-
ment of the technoscience (Bińczyk 2012, Beck 1992) has resulted in making 
their traditional concepts, focusing on the notion of society and human na-
ture, insufficient. Today we need a research platform that will combine the 
moral sensitivity of Aristotle and Marx, as well as rise to the ontological chal-
lenge posed by posthumanism.
35 Eagleton claimed that “To Aristotle ‘Virtue’ 
[...] means something like the technique or know-how of being human” (Ea-
gleton 2004: 125). Through the notion of ontological imagination (supplement-
ed with the use of the modernised concept of phronesis) I aim to ask about 
this  know-how  of  being  human  (and  a  researcher)  in  our  technoscientific 
community. 
It is worth asking who will be teaching this know-how. The reference to STS 
and ANT suggests that the first, ontological part of the work may be done by 
researchers from these disciplines. Radicalised ethnography of the laboratory, 
social studies of science and technology provide us with good tools. We can 
learn how to “juggle” the frames of reference from STS and ANT. A more diffi-
cult question concerns who should teach us which frame to choose. The refer-
ence to the category of prudence, practical wisdom (phronesis) suggests that 
philosophers may teach it, that it may become, perhaps, one of the cultural 
functions of philosophy (Abriszewski 2010: 107-142). However, are philoso-
phers capable of rising to this challenge? 
 
 
                                                             
35 This applies to cognitive science as well, especially to research into extended and embodied 
cognition. Ontological imagination ... 
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Settling the score with methodological solipsism
36 
The notion of ontological imagination came to being as an antidote to the con-
sequences arising from our historical-social entanglement in the structures of 
knowledge. Approaching the matter analytically, agreeing with Wallerstein,  
I suggest  that  we  differentiate  between  disciplines,  that  is  certain  forms  of 
creating  regimes  of  rightness,  methods  of  disciplining  the  intellect,  institu-
tions, that is certain organisational frameworks, and cultures, that is certain 
interpretative  communities  shared  by  scholars  (Wallerstein  2004:  262-297). 
Every one of us must make their own research fit into certain existing institu-
tions, everyone is subject to disciplining factors and a participant of research 
collectives (Fleck 2006), sharing certain thinking styles, that is Wallersteinian 
research cultures. Each of those areas has its own historical determinants, its 
genealogy, layers that can only be revealed through painstaking archaeologi-
cal work. Each of those areas is subject to processes of self-organisation; the 
necessity of survival requires mechanisms of self-creation and self-regulation. 
This results from certain more general system properties that all living organ-
isms (cf. Maturana & Varela 1980) as well as complex social systems (cf. Luh-
mann 2007) are subject to. These processes have their own political and pow-
er-related convections: each of them has its own stakes and power plays (cf. 
Bourdieu  2006).  We  are  beholden  to  institutional  and  organisational  pres-
sures, we must fit our research into the corseting of specific disciplines, we 
must finally belong to specific cultures of researchers. The analysis of one’s 
own determinants, which traditionally belonged to sociology of knowledge, 
following the ontological turn becomes the general theory of society (cf. Sojak 
2004).  We  can  confidently  say  that  sociology  of  knowledge  necessarily  be-
comes ontology. I propose that methodological solipsism can be understood as 
an aversion to considering one’s own situatedness. It is, in my opinion, caused 
by an excessive attachment to analyses on the epistemological level. After the 
time of postmodernism’s dominance we inherit its aversion to undertaking 
ontological analyses. The flight to epistemology causes us to focus on the re-
sults of knowledge-production activities (Abriszewski 2010: 51-63). This is how 
we lose the possibility of tracking the entire knowledge-producing network. 
An analysis on the level of epistemology makes it impossible to see our own 
situatedness. We only see, like the modernists, half of reality (cf. Latour 2010). 
This has serious political consequences; analysis focused on the epistemologi-
cal level (“epistemology police”), abstracted from its own determinants, has a 
                                                             
36 I do not want to enter into detailed argument with the position of “methodological solipsism” by 
Jerry Fodor (Fodor 1980). To be blunt, I believe his position to be an example of a particularly 
harmful approach and destructive to the possibility of interdisciplinary research. I would, how-
ever, like to note that it is impossible to break down the difference between our positions to that 
between internalism and externalism, for the simple reason that I do not consider that distinction 
to be cognitively valuable. 
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tendency to change casual determinants into necessity. An example of such 
a tendency is bioliberalism (Fuller 2006), one of the key dangers posed to so-
cial sciences according to Fuller. This term denotes a certain form of ideology 
resulting  from  the  combination  of  neoliberal  “distrust”  in  society  and  the 
promoting of individualist explanations for human nature (often biologist, or 
quasi-biologist). Bioliberalism
37 constitutes the denial (analogous to the psy-
choanalytic mechanism) of one’s own situatedness. The consequences of bi-
oliberalism include the downfall of social sciences, the downfall of social prac-
tices referring to the level of what is social. Fuller demonstrates that the pro-
ject  of  social  sciences  modelled  after  sociology  is  inextricably  linked  with 
a political cause. By referring back to Durkheimian tradition, he shows that 
the common prefix in “sociology” and “socialism” is by no means a coinci-
dence. The cause behind social sciences was, at the outset, strictly connected 
to their transformative function in relation to societies in and for which they 
were practiced. The key question here is “how to fulfil the promise of social 
science” (Wallerstein 2004: 262-297), while simultaneously retaining the tools 
developed by STS and ANT. Feenberg also points to the necessity for develop-
ing critical social sciences, which would constitute a political economy, that is 
a critique of marketisation, a critique of bureaucracy and social systems and a 
political ecology, that is a critique of technoscience (Feenberg 2010: 159). Only 
a combination of these three main aspects of modernity will make it possible 
to develop a project and a theory of modernisation. It will be all the more dif-
ficult as we know today that there is no progress, including technological pro-
gress, that would not be upheld by transcendental frameworks of the histori-
osophy of modernity. A challenge for today is to practice critical, emancipa-
tory social sciences while knowing that future is a mystery and there is no 
external notion of progress placed somewhere among the laws of history. 
As I have pointed out above, I am treating ontological imagination as an at-
tempt at reconcile the cognitive function of science with the attitude of politi-
cal engagement typical of intellectuals (Fuller 2009). A reciprocal reflection 
over our situatedness or being entangled in structures of knowledge should be 
the first step that begins intellectual work. Why? I start from a similar as-
sumption as Immanuel Wallerstein; I am convinced that, above all, we should 
“unthink”  inherited  structures  of  knowledge  (Wallerstein  1991).  I  am  con-
vinced that it is not the “ontology of the world,” but cognitive assumptions 
generated by structures of knowledge that influence our vision of the world to 
a larger degree. This is the main impediment in studies that focus on prob-
lems, and not on fetishes produced as a result of one’s discipline. As Bruno 
Latour notes, it is following “the actors” dictated by “problems and concerns” 
(and Latour agrees with Mills on this) that should direct our studies. 
                                                             
37 I will return to the term bioliberalism in the later part of the text. Ontological imagination ... 
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Otherwise, what threatens us is the aforementioned methodological solipsism, 
that is a particular kind of insensitivity, the lack of ability to reflect at a level 
of radically considered, ontologised sociology of knowledge. It is a lack of a 
certain  disposition  that makes  it possible to keep  asking anew  about  one’s 
own  situatedness  and  influence  that  it  has  over  our  reflection,  including 
a reflection over our own situatedness (and a reflection over it)
38. Methodolog-
ical solipsism consists in unconscious reifying of conditions that are historical-
ly  incidental.  As  I  have  mentioned  above,  we  are  historically  thrown  into 
them due to our being determined by disciplines, institutions, research cul-
tures. I will provide simple examples: the mind-body problem, fervently un-
dertaken  within  analytic  philosophy,  ignores  the  knowledge  available  to 
a first year ethnology student coming across Marcel Mauss’s works, wherein 
mind-body unity, as well as the proposal emphasising the importance of the 
body and its role in cognition are treated as an obvious and quite common-
sense point of departure. Similarly, having read Bourdieu, a sociology student 
treats the assumption that body / mind is only a derivative of the wider cate-
gory of habitus as obvious. Another example is sociology, which struggles with 
the  distinction  created  as  a  part  of  its  own  institutionalisation:  agency-
structure (action – system). The suspension of sociology between nomothetic 
and idiographic sciences has resulted in cracks and tensions within the disci-
pline. The theories which preferred idiography highlighted the axis of action 
and focused in the interactional tradition, while more nomothetic perspec-
tives resulted in system theories and an economisation of the sociological dis-
course. The attempts at going beyond the agency/ action – system/structure 
distinction conducted by Sztompka or Giddens reinvented the wheel that had 
been already used by Foucault, the Orality/Literacy tradition, or, much earlier, 
by the Annales historical school. 
An example of solipsism lies also in utilising tools shaped in one’s own disci-
pline that have been discredited by other disciplines. In Poland, basing one’s 
knowledge  about  civilisations  outside  Europe  only  on  Hegel’s,  Weber’s,  or 
Feliks Konieczny’s opinions is an emphatic example of a lack of sociological 
imagination. The persistence of such discredited views results from the fact 
that in the 19th century Academy the philosophical and sociological studies 
became separated from ethnographic and Orientalist research. This served to 
legitimise imperialism and colonial divide. After all, the tools used to study 
Western societies could not be used with regard to the “savages,” non-modern 
inhabitants of the rest of the globe. Thus, different research and different re-
searchers were invented. Africa, parts of the Americas, Polynesia or Australia 
were not visited by sociologists going there in order to research societies; they 
                                                             
38 This strange, baroque-style sentence does not appear here by accident; when diagnosing meth-
odological solipsism, I am indebted to Pierre Bourdieu. 
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were visited by anthropologists going there to research the Others - the “sav-
ages”. Exceptions were made for Japan, China and India, which were well-
developed social and political organisms; due to that, it was not appropriate to 
only carry out ethnological research therein, and thus, Oriental studies were 
created. I suggest a quick test in order to check how much our knowledge de-
pends on 19th century conditions: what field of study would we think about 
when  trying  to  find  out  about  the  functioning  of  a  contemporary  multi-
generational Moroccan family in Casablanca? Would that be sociology of the 
family or ethnology? And should we want to learn about holiday and family 
customs in Kansas or Cleveland, would we first go to sociologists or to ethnol-
ogists? The final example is how a-sociological the concept of “state” is when 
developed at political sciences departments. A simple trip to another depart-
ment, to another library would result in the majority of problems disappear-
ing. That today “state-centrism,” or, to put it differently, methodological na-
tionalism remains in force is an astounding example of methodological solip-
sism, resulting from the 19th century division into political sciences, sociology 
and economy. Ever since the “Annales” school represented by F. Braudel, and 
in Poland by Witold Kula or Marian Małowist, we have known that these divi-
sions lack methodological sense. 
Why it is worth overcoming methodological solipsism can be seen in the ef-
fects of it being partially abandoned in certain disciplines. I am referring here 
to the process that can be termed the anthropologisation of humanities (cf. 
Piasek & Kowalewski 2009). It is a process that appeared in the period of coun-
tries being liberated from colonialism and gained force after the 1968 geocul-
tural revolution. The collapse of the colonial order resulted in the impossibil-
ity of further persistence of the 19th century order of knowledge structures. 
Unemployed anthropologists had to return home. 
Anthropologists started to study the societies that would previously dele-
gate them to study the Others. The process turned out to be more radical 
in its results than could have been expected. Ethnograpic research into 
science and technology was one of such unexpected revolutions within the 
structures of knowledge. There took place the aforementioned “lowering 
of the tone” within studies on science (Shapin 2010: 1-14). The attempts at 
connecting research from the field of distributed and embodied cognition 
with science and technology studies are another promising example of go-
ing beyond the methodological solipsism (Afeltowicz 2012, Bińczyk 2011, 
Derra 2013). 
Methodological solipsism constitutes one of the more serious obstacles that 
make it impossible for social sciences (and philosophy, which aids them) to 
achieve a stage that biology was at when neo-Darwinian synthesis was being 
created. In order for that to be possible, a double process must take place: 
first, developing a theory (a set of theories) that will be a platform enabling Ontological imagination ... 
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the creation of one social science (or, better, a set of social sciences). It is only 
within one such social science that the functionalisation of scientists can take 
place, caused by challenges, concerns and needs of our collectivity. To an ex-
tent, in my search for social science (Wallerstein 2004: 262-297) I am indebted 
to Immanuel Wallerstein and the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructur-
ing of Social Sciences that he used to head (Wallerstein & Flis 1999). 
Unfortunately, until now, narrow reified research perspectives raised to the 
rank of truths about the structure of the world have obscured the possibility 
of studying both the structure of the world, and the structure of knowledge. 
 
Ontological imagination in action: what technological determinism and 
the Orality/Literacy Theory teach us 
Below I am going to present ontological imagination in action; I will also show 
briefly why the lack of such disposition contributed to an insufficient absorp-
tion of the tradition of technological determinism and the “Great Theory of 
Orality / Literacy” (Godlewski 2008: 151-198). The closing of research cultures, 
disciplining practices that stabilise the given research field and social inertia 
of institutions resulted in the fact that in philosophical reflection such per-
sonas as Jack Goody, Elizabeth Eisenstein or Eric A. Havelock are virtually 
unknown. It is interesting that also Bruno Latour, who wanders between dis-
ciplines, frequently referring to philosophy, has blurred the traces of his de-
pendence, even though he owes much to this tradition (Latour 2012). 
 
What the philosophers missed 
Let us take a closer look at the case of methodological solipsism, which has 
severely infested philosophy (and particularly the philosophy of language and 
analytical philosophy
39). Since the times of Frege and Wittgenstein, philoso-
phers have made language analysis into a particular object of their reflection, 
limiting themselves especially frequently to analyses of the so-called ordinary 
English language. There is nothing strange in them making such an important 
object of reflection out of this material of thought. After Kant, the tendency to 
                                                             
39 The author of the present article witnessed an information society panel during a conference 
devoted to information society, organised by the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (ALWS, 
Kirchberg 2007), at which the cream of Anglo-Saxon analytics philosophy was not able to cite any 
sociologial theory, not even a simple one (including those pertaining to information society). The 
discussion during the panel went along the lines of rules of the game well-known within analyti-
cal philosophy: the participants discussed issues such as truth, meaning, information, etc. Nobody 
mentioned  the  problems  connected  with  technology,  economy,  cognitive  studies,  sociology  or 
culture. The ontology of the world was nothing compared to the wealth of the world that can be 
conjured when analysing sentences in the English language. This event was one of the impulses 
for the development of methodological solipsism and ontological imagination. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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ask about the circumstances of one’s own thinking is natural. Therefore, the 
analysis  of  language fits  smoothly  into  the  post-Kantian thought  dynamics. 
However, it is another issue that is intriguing: to what extent philosophers did 
not care about the questions regarding the mechanics of appearing and func-
tioning of a language. The processes of learning, of world technologies of intel-
lect (Marody 1987), or the economic aspects of knowledge production were 
not an issue under reflection. It is intriguing that while seeking sense, philos-
ophers would wander over to different (nonexistent!) Twin Earths in search of 
water that is not H2O. They also tried to understand the world from the per-
spective of bats or the zombie, but did not make an effort to notice that they 
owe the development and the character of their reflection to the development 
of  the  writing  revolution,  print,  mass  education  and  electricity  (McLuhan 
1975). This inability to notice that which is close, constitutive for experience 
(Nowak 2001) is intriguing. It is especially interesting when keeping in mind 
that at least two philosophers used the same example, referencing a sheet of 
white  paper  in  order  to  demonstrate  the  reality  outside  one’s  own  mind. 
However, neither Descartes nor Husserl were sufficiently gifted with ontologi-
cal imagination to make a sheet of paper as a thought tool into an object of 
reflection. A spiteful answer comes to mind: tools as mediation in the Latouri-
an sense were so transparent for them as to become invisible. The philoso-
phers  lacked  enough  imagination  to  ask  about  the  circumstances  allowing 
them to philosophise. 
Let us pose several questions connected with the subject: can a philosophical 
method that derives the ontology of the world from something as particular as 
written language and its features claim to be universal? In a 1982 book, Ong 
writes “We know that formal logic is the invention of Greek culture after it 
had interiorized the technology of alphabetic writing, and so made a perma-
nent part of its noetic resources the kind of thinking that alphabetic writing 
made possible. [...] In brief, [the] illiterate subjects seemed not to operate with 
formal deductive procedures at all [...]” (Ong 1992: 81). When describing the 
world, creating our ontological descriptions, should we choose the descrip-
tions derived from written language or speech, or maybe draw from the sec-
ond oral reality (Nowak 2013b)? Or should we, perhaps, have at our disposal 
ontological theories that could also explain the dynamics of orality, literacy 
and  post-literacy  as conditions  of  our thinking? What  today,  thanks  to the 
scholars  from  the  tradition  of  distributed  cognition,  is  increasingly  more 
available for philosophical reflection has long been present in our knowledge 
resources. I would like to pose a question in a philosophical mode: how is it 
possible that the philosophy of language was not able to notice what was be-
ing discovered within the so-called Orality / Literacy Theory and make it into 
an object of its reflection? Why were such scholars as Elizabeth Eisenstein, 
Jack Goody, Walter Ong or Marshall McLuhan not included in the circulation 
of the philosophical reflection on a regular basis? This oversight results in Ontological imagination ... 
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a state of matters wherein philosophers who, in theory, are best predisposed 
to fulfil the function of mediators, messengers and who mediate between var-
ious areas of culture, are not able to rise to this challenge. It seems to me that 
this is largely the result of institutional limitations, workplace culture (indi-
vidual  rather  than  team  work,  lack  of  contact  with  material  or  laboratory 
background during the research process). In short, within this discipline there 
is a lack of conditions necessary for developing ontological imagination. Let us 
take a closer look at several quotations and consider why they have not be-
come a common “centre of gravity” around which the research practices of 
philosophers focus. 
Let us begin with a rather sarcastic quotation depicting the consequences of 
philosophical work: 
What I find most repulsive about philosophers is their evacuating thought 
process. The more often and the more deftly they use their basic notions, 
the less world is left around them. They are like barbarians in a spacious, 
high house, full of wondrous works. They stand there, sleeves rolled up, 
and they methodically throw everything they can out the window: arm-
chairs, paintings, plates, pets and animals, until only naked walls remain. 
Sometimes even the doors and windows follow in the end. A naked house 
remains. The philosophers imagine such a devastation is better (Canetti 
1996: 141).
40 
Canetti pointedly shows that using one of the most important tools of contem-
porary philosophising - the abstraction method, and utilising the tools of logi-
cal analysis - can result in the loss of what Mills called sociological imagina-
tion. Philosophers gain the certainty of judgement, but they lose the world 
about which any judgements could be spoken. He notes further that “those 
Oxford philosophers scribble and scribble until there is nothing left. I have 
learned a lot from them: I know now that it is better not to start scribbling at 
all” (Canetti 1996: 195). This quotation quite clearly shows that there is value 
in performing an archaeological job, discovering places of bifurcation in the 
history  of  our  structures  of  knowledge,  re-considering  their  consequences, 
going back “to before the bifurcation” and beginning the work “anew.” Proce-
dures of abstraction, using logical schemata, deductive work are not some-
thing negative. They can be a useful tool which increases our cognitive abili-
ties. The problem appears when we do not comprehend that “Neither Hume 
nor Kant, however, detected the hidden cause of our Western bias toward 
sequence as ”logic” in the allpervasive technology of the alphabet” (McLuhan 
1975: 89). So says the famous trickster, the magician from Toronto. As it is 
usual when it comes to McLuhan, the thesis is posed in a bold, daring way, 
with exaggeration. What does the quotation tell us? It connects Western philo-
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sophical reflection with alphabetic writing. The quotation is short, taken out 
of the larger context, from which we would find out that it is also important to 
appeal to printing technology. Why is it that despite the presence of the names 
of  the  philosophers  Hume  and  Kant  we  will  not  find  many  philosophers 
whose theoretical apparatuses would be able to deal with the ontology sug-
gested by this humble quotation? And we have not yet put into motion many 
other  frameworks  of  reference,  we  have  not  asked  about  capitalism 
(Zybertowicz 1995), about changes within biological sciences, about the con-
nection between the appearance of the nations and print (Anderson 1997). 
Print, and visuality, coupled therewith, are key determining factors that make 
it possible for scientific rationality to appear. Stabilisation of knowledge, the 
creation of “centres of calculation” make it possible to master the world, re-
duce it to an inscription, thanks to which one can have command over the 
world (Latour 2012). The task would not be so difficult but for the fact that 
there took place a joyous castration of ontological imagination in the history 
of philosophy. Worse yet, the political results thereof were frequently prob-
lematic when philosophers would start to seek the sources of rationality. In-
stead of, as I have already mentioned, taking a look at their close surround-
ings - the piece of paper - they would seek the essence of “European rationali-
ty” in imagined attributes of the Europeans, mythical history of Greece, or the 
characteristics of Protestantism (Nowak 2011). 
 
How many frames of reference can we invoke? 
Today the Orality / Literacy Theory has an opportunity to enter philosophy 
through the back door, in a sense; this is possible thanks to contemporary 
cognitive studies (cf. Hutchins 1995). The turn towards distributed cognition is 
a consequence of the evolution that has been taking place in contemporary 
cognitive studies and that has influence on the image of academic practices 
(Bińczyk 2011: 119-137). These processes can be metaphorically deemed the 
end of the period of the “skin and skull” usurpation (Clark & Chalmers 2008: 
342-357). Distributed cognition constitutes another, consistent step in leaving 
the solipsist cul-de-sac into which Western philosophy, especially its analytical 
variety, has stumbled. The lack of “unthinking” of its entanglement and situ-
atedness, the lack of reflection conducted within ontologically radicalised so-
ciology of knowledge results in our cognitive efforts defending in a dispropor-
tionate manner the approaches that are worth rejecting. Computational ap-
proaches to  consciousness (treated  in a  “Cartesian”  way),  still  defended  by 
some, were one example of such a “cul-de-sac” (Miłkowski 2010). When start-
ing from the traditions of embodied and distributed cognition, the problem 
would  have  to  be  presented  differently.  Firstly,  the  computationality  itself 
undergoes a reflection as an element of coupling of the environment, arte-
facts, minds, inscriptions, etc (Latour 2012); secondly, consciousness and com-Ontological imagination ... 
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putationality also undergo such a reflection. As a result, were they coupled, 
they would need to be relativised to the given environment every time. Here 
we arrive at the possibility of depicting both components of the ontological 
imagination: the sociological-holistic and the constructive-political ones. The 
first one demands radical re-defining of our thinking about the unit of analy-
sis in a discussion about computationality and consciousness. If cognition is 
realised through the environment (including tools and artefacts), and the body 
that is coupled therewith, then, as we remember, an interference into the en-
vironment (and the body) has a moral dimension (Clark & Chalmers 2008: 342-
357). At this point, our discussions cease to be academic, and there appears 
a role for an intellectual. If some device / artefact causes a change in cognitive 
possibilities, it means that we are also changing the entire collective  with its 
members. The issue of literacy and of the communicative conditions for the 
existence of certain forms of democratic politics may be a good example here 
(Nowak 2010). 
Before we go back to this issue, let us take a look at the complexity of notions 
connected with the Orality / Literacy Theory. It is a good exercise if we want to 
practise  “juggling”  frameworks  of  reference.  Let  us  track  the  areas  of  our 
knowledge structures that would come under revision when taking into ac-
count  notional  and  cognitive  consequences  of  writing  and  reading  (Olson 
2010). I will omit here a more detailed account of the psychodynamics of orali-
ty (Ong 1992) and the consequences of literacy (Latour 2012; Eisenstein 2004). 
The first issue of orality and literacy is connected with the so-called “great 
divide” (Godlewski 2008: 151), that is the divide into the modern and the non-
modern ones, into Us and the Others, or, finally, into the West and the rest. In 
Levi Strauss’s discussion with Goody this division took shape of a distinction: 
a savage mind vs. a domesticated mind (cf. Goody 2011). The discussion over 
the notion of oral and literate cultures soon leaves the safe frames of ethno-
logical references and it becomes a political discussion entangled in postcolo-
nial issues. It is sufficient to realise to what extent various cognitive communi-
ties (both literate and oral) were responsible for the fact that Western science 
had  for  so  long  perceived  the  Others as  the  “nations  without history”  (see 
Wolff 2009). This, in turn, made it possible to write such versions of history 
that legitimised the conquest of the world by the West, showing it as a histori-
cal and civilisational necessity (cf. Goody 2009). The characteristics that result 
from different dynamics of cognitive environments and the artefacts coupled 
therewith were and are understood as characteristics of cultures. Subsequent-
ly, there takes place an essentialisation of these cultures and a secondary as-
sessment  of  their  representatives.  Communicative  characteristics  of  orality 
require a deeper immersion into the context of community, as they connect a 
message with the recipient more closely, and the communication is synchron-
ic,  “orchestral”  (see  Winkin  2007).  The  embodiment  of  communication  is 
a readily  noticeable  characteristics.  The  primary  orality  does  not  create  a AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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strict division between speech, song, or dance. It does not have a stable notion 
of the “signifier” and the “signified,” either. 
It is only writing, and especially print, that makes possible a community that 
stabilises linguistic (literate) practices to a degree that allows the abstract lan-
guages to be created. It is only writing, alphabetic language and its spread 
through the process of mass education makes it possible for deductive meth-
ods  to  be  widely  used  as  thought  tools:  “In  brief,  [the]  illiterate  subjects 
seemed not to operate with formal deductive procedures at all” (Ong 1992: 
181). However, this does not mean that oral cultures are “lower” than the lit-
erate ones; while certain cognitive possibilities (e.g. formal logics) are more 
difficult to obtain on their ground, other features are more difficult to reach 
for subjects from highly literate cultures. In the last years, literacy has been 
de-mythologised  (Olson  2010:  35-39).  Following  Olson,  I  will  name  several 
myths  pertaining  to  the  alleged  superiority  of  literacy  over  orality.  Let  us 
begin with the banal assumption that writing constitutes a transcription of 
speech. This is a good example for the lack of ontological imagination. The 
difference between literacy and orality is not strictly “linguistic.” Orality and 
literacy require completely separate social institutions, communities, “distrib-
uted” systems of cognition that would be coupled with them. Orality demands 
different, “living” participants of communication, mnemotechniques (singing, 
prayer  rosaries,  rituals,  rhyming,  etc.).  Writing  puts  in  motion  global  net-
works of artefacts (tablets , papyrus, a laptop, a pen), it demands systems of 
schools and a long educational training. Both systems are connected with dif-
ferent ways of creating social power. It is enough to refer here to Havelock’s 
reflections on power and orality in the Ancient Greece (Havelock 2007: 150-
169) or Foucault’s reflections on biopolitics and the classification systems pos-
sible thanks to writing (Foucault 2012). Now we can move on to the second 
myth: the superiority of writing over speech. Writing and speech are different 
“distributed systems of cognition,” and each of them is connected to certain 
“losses” and “gains.” The third myth is a variant on the previous one, and it 
pertain to the superiority of alphabet over other systems of writing. According 
to  the  fourth  myth,  writing  is  an  instrument  of social  development  (Olson 
2010: 45). The correlations between the development of literacy and modern 
democracy are frequently emphasised. The fact that writing made it possible 
for large, hierarchical communities to appear, for obedient soldiers, for effi-
cient workers to be created - standardised subjects of biopower - is referred to 
less often (Olson 2010: 45). As quoted by Olson, Levi-Strauss did not hesitate to 
state that “If my hypothesis is correct, it has to be assumed that the first func-
tion of writing was facilitating the introduction of slavery” (in: Olson 2010: 
45). Another myth is connecting literacy with cultural development. Latour’s 
delight over inscriptions (Latour 2012) may mislead us, cause us to succumb to 
the writing-centric and ethno-centric stereotype. Cognitive research (Hutchins 
1977) shows that highly developed systems of navigation function also in illit-Ontological imagination ... 
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erate cultures. We can smoothly move on to the final myth: writing is con-
nected with cognitive development. The aforementioned example of naviga-
tion in Micronesia is very instructive in that regard. Hutchins noted that dif-
ferent situating of the “cognising subject/unit” was one of the characteristics 
of Micronesian navigation. Western navigators treat themselves as a mobile 
object, moving around the globe. Analogously, a finger (a pencil, a scriber) 
moves  around  the  map  (inscription).  Micronesian  navigators  treated  them-
selves as the stable place, and the sea as a variable. It was the sea that flowed 
in and out, the boat itself was treated as an “immobile” point of reference.  
This interestingly interacts with two anecdotes recalled by Olson. In the first 
one he considers the paradoxical experience that is observing the evacuation 
map of a building. There we are, standing in front of a map on which there is 
a dot and the text “you are here,” the disembodiment that is assumed in the 
culture of writing (and of printed inscription) is so obvious that is unnoticea-
ble. The second anecdote pertains to the Inuit and their companions from the 
city that would wander with them. After several hours of futile searching for 
supplies,  the  city-dwellers,  equipped  with  maps,  announced  “we  are  lost,” 
while the Inuit replied “no, it’s the supplies that are lost.” Considering the con-
temporary discoveries in cognitive science (and enactivism in particular) it 
seems that situated, embodied manner of self-cognition characteristic of the 
non-literate people was much more cognitively adequate than the disembod-
ied “Cartesian” point of view of the literate ones. As I pointed out before, the 
orality-literacy debate may have its implications for a revision of historiog-
raphy, a  change  of  perspective  on  the  so-called “cultural differences.”  It  is 
worth mentioning here that a rather controversial issue of supposed connec-
tions  between  class,  ethnic  and  racial  structures  and  intelligence  (Murray 
1994) can be connected to the “discoveries” made within this tradition. The 
author of The Bell Curve associated social and educational achievement with 
intelligence quotient (measured through tests). He additionally associated this 
quotient with genetically-understood racial background. This was groundless, 
not only because of “political incorrectness”, but predominantly because there 
are no grounds for it in contemporary genetics. The current findings within it 
do not confirm the existence of “continental” subpopulations, known tradi-
tionally  as  “races”  (Strzałko  2010).  The  debate  surrounding  the  book  was 
heated, with one of the more interesting voices being the words of a palaeon-
tologist and evolutionary biologist, J. Gould (Gould 1996). I would like to avoid 
a debate in the area of biology and genetics here, as using that framework can 
prove  very  imprudent.  Not because  I  lack  the  skills  necessary for crossing 
disciplinary boundaries, but because I would not like to legitimise the very 
practice of using “genetic-evolutionary-biologist” framework before present-
ing different ones - too bold translations, argumentative “jumps” should be 
avoided. If we want to explain a given phenomenon, for example professional 
or educational success, by means of genetics or evolutionary references, it is AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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worth asking if we had previously used different, less risky frameworks of 
reference. For example, Murray does not have to recourse to genetics or evo-
lution  in  order to  explain  differences  in  intelligence  and  their correlations 
with achievement.  
A much more available explanation becomes obvious when we look at the 
issue  from  the  perspective  of  distributed  and  embodied  cognition,  supple-
mented by the Orality / Literacy Theory. Intelligence as measured with tests is 
predominantly oriented towards the type of knowledge correlated with litera-
cy. Such features of thinking as the ability to think in an abstract manner, the 
idea of a sequence, the ability to use syllogism are almost absent in thinking 
that is originally oral, as for instance Łuria pointed out in his research (Ong 
1992). It is worth adding that oral communication is based to a larger extent 
on restricted code depending on the context, while literacy culture prefers 
more  abstract  elaborated  codes  (Bernstein  1990).  Despite  their  names,  the 
differences between the two codes are not evaluative: they only denote two 
opposite poles on the scale. Bernstein noted that reproduction of class rela-
tions as a part of education may be described precisely with the use of the 
aforementioned codes. For the purposes of this text, it suffices to say that low-
er class children who lack the same access to books, newspapers, or to literacy 
and schooling internalised in the parents’ (family’s, acquaintances’) habituses, 
typically find schooling more difficult. To children who are strongly oral (and 
who use the restricted codes more eagerly), school knowledge may appear 
non-obvious and strange. The dynamics of oral language, which is inseparably 
connected with communication communities, and aided by gesture or moves 
of the body, results in statements being characterised by additiveness (rather 
than  using  main/subordinate  clauses),  high  redundancy,  neothic  (mythical) 
strangeness, etc. The encounter with the literacy culture of the school (as well 
as the IQ tests) results in an intercultural clash. When, as it was the case with 
Murray in the USA, we add the interlayering of social, class and race divisions 
(in the sense of social perception of “race”), cultural difference becomes deep-
er. Lower class children (in the USA, these are to a significant extent African 
Americans) will achieve worse results in intelligence tests only because they 
were not socialised to that kind of an environment, a “distributed system of 
cognition” that is highly literate culture. We have to remember that literacy or 
orality are not features of individuals, but, above all, characteristics of entire 
societies. Scribner and Cole did not notice this in their criticism of Jack Goody. 
They argued that the development of deductive thinking, the ability to use 
syllogisms is not, as Goody wanted, a feature of literacy. According to these 
scholars, this is a function of school education (Olson 2010: 87). This is a great 
example for the lack of both sociological imagination, and its more radical 
version - ontological imagination. Both psychologists took an individual per-
son and their intellectual competences as the basic unit of analysis. They did 
not see that literacy is not a feature of individuals, but of a whole network of Ontological imagination ... 
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actors: artefacts, students, schools, etc. Goody’s thesis emphasising the role of 
literacy  implicitly  included  the  conviction  regarding  the  importance  of  the 
system of school education. It seems to me that the very brief explanation of 
the correlations between IQ and class (and “racial”) background as presented 
above is more convincing than the one based on genetic criteria. One does not 
have to make any risky translations and ontological “jumps”. Moreover, my 
explanation  makes  it possible for  specific political  steps to  be taken.  If  we 
want to measure success with IQ tests, it means that, beside extreme cases 
(severe mental disability), we measure the degree to which a given person has 
been  coupled  with  high  literacy culture.  If  we consider  high  IQ  something 
desirable, we must broaden the access to the high literacy culture. Murray’s 
solution had a politically reverse effect, as a reference to genetics closes the 
political debate, and introduces karmic language: you have been born with 
this, and not a different set of genes, so you have this, and not a different kind 
of fate. I have chosen Murray’s example deliberately, as he represents a ten-
dency known as bioliberalism. This is a certain form of ideology stemming 
from coupling neoliberal “distrust” in society with promoting biologist or qua-
si-biologist explanations of human nature (Fuller 2006: 12). 
Bioliberalism may manifest itself for example through favouring the catego-
ries of talent or genius. The best example of this kind, completely devoid of 
sociological and ontological imagination, may be Satoshi Kanazawa’s reflec-
tions on the subject of relations between geniuses and criminals (Kanazawa 
2003: 257-272). We will find out from his analyses what level of testosterone 
the scientists had
41, whether they had wives and children. We will learn noth-
                                                             
41 It was Cordelia Fine (Fine 2010: 78-89) who wrote about neurosexism and the doubts connected 
with attributing features of the brain (and then, accordingly, of personality) to the exposition to 
testosterone during gestation. Neurosexism, which derives from bioliberalism, is a widespread 
and popular approach. For example, as a well-known Polish cognitive scientist stated in a popular 
interview, “Why is it that so that the majority of piano players are men? Because the left and the 
right hand play separately, which is easier for men. Perhaps this also has an evolutionary back-
ground:  at  one  point,  man  would  have  to  make  signs  towards  another,  while  simultaneously 
watching the prey. And why is that so that there are so many female violin players in orchestras? 
[...] Because that requires a great coordination of the work of both hands, which women do bet-
ter. Their brain hemispheres communicate better with one another due to their corpus callosum. 
In men, the cooperation between the left and the right hemisphere is weaker, which makes it 
easier for them to carry out various activities at the same time - because one does not disturb the 
other so much (http://www.wysokieobcasy.pl/wysokie-obcasy/1,98083,13772221,Dlaczego_kobiety 
_sa_skrzypaczkami__a_mezczyzni_mysla.html 29.09.13). Should he have troubled himself to use 
sociological (not even ontological) imagination, and carried out minimal sociological and histori-
cal analysis, he would have noticed the increasing number of women piano players. Moreover, 
should he have wanted to take a look at ethnomusicological research, he would have noticed that 
traditionally, it was mostly men who were violin players (at least in our region). Interestingly, it 
would be very easy to point out that in orchestras playing classical music in the USA there were 
few  Afro-American  musicians,  in  contrast  to  jazz  orchestras.  Would  it  be  also  possible  to  use 
a biological argument so easily, without the risk of a political scandal, in this case? AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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ing about organisation and institutionalisation of science, economic and class 
dependences, we will learn nothing about inheriting the social position, ei-
ther. Obviously, according to well-rooted misogyny, there do not exist women 
geniuses in these studies. 
 
Conclusion: What is to be done? How to reconcile the strictness  
of a scientist with the zeal of an intellectual? 
The present text is, in part, a manifesto. It has been born out of the obvious 
conviction regarding the necessity to reform social sciences (and/or) philoso-
phy.  I  am  convinced  that  such  a  reform  should occur  in  two  aspects:  one 
strictly academic, and the other - connected with public activity. In the first 
case, the results achieved within Science and Technology Studies or cognitive 
studies trends such as “distributed” and “embodied” cognition seem promis-
ing to me. Moreover, the results of monumental sociological-historical written 
within the historical-systemic paradigm (inspired by Braudel and Wallerstein) 
are also promising. The aforementioned approaches, although distant from 
one another when we think in narrow categories of disciplines and institu-
tions, are close due to the shared “culture”. Let us list several features of that 
culture: breaking away from the historically shaped divisions: body / mind, 
the West / the rest of the world, theory / practice, etc. Each of the aforemen-
tioned research areas draws scholars from many different, traditionally de-
fined fields. I am convinced that social sciences (and philosophy) cannot with-
draw to a text-centric and theory-centric ivory tower if they want to survive. 
This is closely connected to the second aspect of our studies: being engaged in 
social change. It is a risky undertaking. The call for change requires one to 
answer to the question of Lenin / Czernyszewski that has already been men-
tioned herein: How to proceed? When a scholar becomes engaged in social 
change, fulfils the role of an intellectual, it always carries the “Syracuse” risk, 
that is that of a hasty and harmful entanglement in political issues. However, 
indifference is not a solution. The outline of the concept of “political imagina-
tion” that I have presented above is an attempt at connecting both tasks listed. 
The first of them consists in ontology of ourselves, a radicalised version of 
historical ontology that was proposed by Michel Foucault (Foucault 2000) and 
Ian Hacking (Hacking 2004).The historical ontology of ourselves contains po-
litical potential, which, however, is frequently far from obvious. Foucault au-
thored many insightful analyses of power mechanisms, but he was not a good 
philosopher of politics, and his intellectual choices were both prudent (when 
he supported Polish “Solidarity”) and less prudent (when he was fascinated by 
Khomeini’s revolution in Iran). This is why in addition to radicalised - thanks 
to cognitive studies and STS - historical ontology of ourselves, we need ethical 
and political analyses. This is where I place the greatest hopes for renewing 
the potential contained in the notion of being prudent, of practical wisdom - Ontological imagination ... 
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phronesis. To conclude, without phronetic politics, ontological analyses are 
only an esoteric game, whereas politics and critical reflection are blind with-
out a posthumanist, historical ontology. 
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